(Minghui.org) Chinese American Ping Li of Florida was sentenced to four years in prison, fined $250,000, and given three years of supervised release on November 25, 2024, according to a U.S. Department of Justice press release. Li was charged with conspiring to act as an agent of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) without notifying the U.S. Attorney General.

The announcement was made by Assistant Attorney General Matthew G. Olsen of the National Security Division, Attorney Roger B. Handberg for the Middle District of Florida, and Executive Assistant Director Robert Wells of the FBI’s National Security Branch.

Ping Li pleaded guilty to acting as a CCP agent on August 23, 2024. (Mugshot courtesy Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office)

Li Ping, 59, immigrated to the United States from China and is now a U.S. citizen. Li worked for a major U.S. telecommunications company and an international information technology company.

Li has acted as an agent of the Chinese government for many years, providing information about Falun Gong practitioners, Chinese dissidents, and democracy advocates to Chinese intelligence officials.

According to the plea agreement and other court documents, the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) is in charge of collecting civil intelligence for the CCP. The MSS often uses “cooperative contacts” located outside of China to achieve its intelligence goals, including obtaining information about foreign companies or industrial matters, foreign politicians or intelligence officers, and information about Chinese political dissidents residing in those countries. These cooperative contacts assist the MSS in a variety of ways, including conducting research on topics of interest to China, which can be used to further the MSS’s mission.

Li admitted that since as early as 2012, he served as a cooperative contact working at the direction of officers of the MSS to obtain information of interest to the Chinese government. Li obtained a wide variety of information at the request of the MSS, including information about Chinese dissidents and democracy advocates, Falun Gong practitioners, and American non-governmental organizations, and reported that information to the MSS. Li also provided the MSS with information obtained from his employer. Li used various anonymous online accounts to communicate with the MSS and traveled to China to meet with the MSS.

For example, in August 2012, an MSS officer requested that Li provide information about Falun Gong practitioners and democracy advocates in the United States. Less than a week after receiving this request, Li sent the name and personal information of a Falun Gong practitioner residing in St. Petersburg, Florida.

In March 2015, an MSS officer asked Li to provide information about branch offices opened in China by his employer, a large American telecommunications company. Three weeks later, Li responded with the requested information.

In March 2017, an MSS officer asked Li for a training instruction plan. In April of the same year, Li responded that he had uploaded the materials to an online account he shared with the MSS officer, and asked the officer to delete the materials after reading them.

Over the years, Li has had many exchanges with the MSS officers. At the request of these officers, Li provided information about two Israeli Falun Gong book authors, an unnamed American company, and its president and the president’s wife.

Li also provided the MSS officers with information about a male Falun Gong practitioner who participated in a protest in front of the Chinese Consulate in California, including his address, phone number, and the make and model of his car.